Gas in Europe has
Over the more than 30 year history of the European natural gas industry to date, longrun supply costs have hardly mattered. To the east of the former "Iron Curtain," East European countries' gas was imported in the'context of COMECON trade agreements within which, of course, prices were unrelated to western economic concepts Shabad, 1979: Hoffman, 1985; and Park, 1979) . Within the rest of Europe,l the effectively state-owned, controlled and/or regulated gas industry has generally evolved under the influence of planned developments, rather than market forces (Odell, 1969; Estrada, 1988) . Supply side opportunities were controlled and constrained as, indeed, were market developments. In the absence of competition, market values have been generally umelated to longrun supply prices. Economic rents, collected partly by producing and distributing companies, but mainly by the governments of the gas-rich countries, have constituted a formidable percentage of total revenues generated by the industry since 1965; the year in which the exploitation of the super-giant Groningen gas field, with extremely low costs of production, began (Odell, P.R., 1969 and .
The Link between Oil and Gas
The deliberate and definitive link between international oil prices and the prices paid to indigenous gas producers-and for most gas subsequently imported into western Europewas established in the early 1960s through the strategy jointly evolved between the Dutch government and the Shell/Esso consortium responsible for the discovery and development of the Groningen field (Odell, 1969 and . This created a barrier to the expansion of Europe's gas markets in the period of low and falling oil prices through to the early 1970s. Thereafter, with the onset of OPEC's control over international oil prices, gas prices in Europe were enabled to rise to levels of more than an order of magnitude above the costs of supply.
This, in itself, curbed demand, but, in add!-tion, for reasons related to a perception of gas scarcity, policies designed to limit natural gas use were irnposed. 2 Moreover, the Netherlands, Britain and Norway, also imposed restraints on potentially highly profitable gas production so artificially equilibrating the market at a scale which was well below that which would have been achieved under competitive market conditions (Odell, 1988 and 1992) .
The subsequent two-thirds fall in the oil price (from its peak level in 1981/82) has brought gas prices tumbling by approximately the same percentage. Given that gas has gradually come to be recognised as a preferred source of energy-for environmental as well as 2/ National policy steps to achieve this objective were subsumed in a European Economic Community decision in 1975 to restrict the use of gas in power stations, namely, EEe Directive no. 75/404 (see Odell, 1988) .
for strategic/ security reasons-and given that such considerations are often reflected in favourable tax conditions for gas vis-a.-vis other fuels, then gas demand has been stimulated (from 200 BCM in 1981 to over 300 BCM in 1995 . On the other hand, the fall in the price of gas appears to have had virtually no impact on the availability of supply. At most, the price fall led to the premature termination of production from a few small fields in France, Germany and elsewhere as they became uneconomic to continue in operation. Meanwhile, as far as production potential in Europe is concerned, this has, as shown in Table 1 , continued to strengthen, related essentially to the continuity of investments which have ensured reserves additions in excess of year by year depletion. This is expressed in the continuing temporal build-up of proven and probable reserves. Table 1 shows the four decades' long evolution of Western European reserves since 1956 through a period, that is, of energy sector traumas arising from the volatility of the international oil market. For the 30 years to 1986 the data show how demand limitations and production constraints led to reserves building up very strongly. Reserves additions were "-multiple of the volumes of gas produced in each of the successive decades. Even in the decade since the price collapse of 1986, gross additions to proven and probable reserves amount to almost 4000 BCM, compared with the 10 year cumulative production of only some 2000 BCM. Of the total presently-indicated original recoverable reserves of 13,000 BCM from the fields discovered, almost twothirds remain to be used. Even in the context of $17/bbl oil (see Table 2 ), Western Europe's potential to produce natural gas remains formidable with an approximate 35 years reserves to production ratio at the 1995 rate of production. Supply prospects for indigenous gas will be examined later in this paper, but it is first necessary to set the framework of prices and demand within which that supply needs to be evaluated. The bases and assumptions * Assuming the continuation of present gas production and use policies.
Indigenous Reserves Development
** On the basis of estimates of the reserves in fields already discovered by 1993: and with an assumption that they will appreciate by 5% by the end of 1995. In addition, of course, there is also a near-zero probability that no more fields will be discovered, given the continuation of an extensive and intensive exploration effort for natural gas in many Western European countries and their off-shore areas.
Sources: Compiled by the author from various sources, notably the annual publications of the governments of Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom on the activities of the oil and gas industries in those countries. 5/ Based on gasoil with 40.55 million BTU /ton and 7.5 bbls/ton and low sulphur fuel oil with 39.23 million BTU/ton and 6.7 bbls/ton.
6/ See Table 3 for the derivation of the 1995 price. Assumptions for the other years are based on a continuing exchange rate of DM 1.46 to 1 US dollar, and a 10% reduction per decade in the relationship betvveen the average gas price to end users and the average gas price at the frontier/beach. from which these are derived are set out in Table 2 .
Contemporary Prices for Gas in Europe
Aspects of the contemporary pricing of gas in Western Europe's six major consuming countries (responsible for about 93% of total West European gas use in 1995) are set out in Tables  3,4 and 5. 3 in Table 3 these data on prices do not indicate that market liberalisation in the UK had, by 1995, produced the lowest overall pre-tax consumer prices: Italian and Dutch prices remained below those of the UK. The weighted average prices for the six countries taken as a whole are shown in Table 4 . On average, users pay more than twice, and domestic users well over three times, the border price: even without taking end-user taxes into account. Table 5 , on the other hand, contrasts fully tax-paid end-user gas prices with the equivalents for competing sources of energy. Major differences in the incidence of taxes on energy between countries pick out the UK as the country with lowest prices. But in as far as this low-tax situation applies generally to energy, other energy sources there are still generally lower priced than gas (on a calorific basis, without taking contrasting efficiencies in use into account). But the price differentials working against gas relative to other fuels are usually even worse in the other countries: except for the Netherlands. There, only power station coal is significantly lower priced than gas. Significantly, natural gas' 42.6% share of total energy use in the Netherlands stands at well over twice the European average of 18.8% (BP, 1995a) , indicating how far gas' substitution for other sources of energy could go in the rest of Europe under gas pricing policies which are more competitive with alternative energy sources.
In Belgium, other sources of energy are generally very competitively priced. Gas thus has no significant price advantage in any sector (except over low sulphur fuel oil in power generation), so it is hardly surprising that gas use is restricted to 18% of total energy use. The same is true for Germany (where gas also accounts for 18% of energy use), except in respect of coal as a consequence of the continued use for political reasons of much higher cost indigenous production. In France (with only 12% gas use), cheaper alternatives to gas are available in most sectors. In other words, over much of Europe gas pricing policies (sometimes including energy taxation policies) inhibit the expansion of gas demand. This limits the economies of scale which could otherwise Table 6 and percentage use per sector shown in Table 3 Source: Derived from Table 3 98 be achieved and so adds yet another factor making the border supply price of gas less significant to the prospects for the evolution of the European gas market than is often portrayed.
Demand Expansion and Implications for Supply
Notwithstanding the continuing constraints on gas use, the European market for gas is, and will remain, in an expansionist mode (Pauwels, 1994; Prior, 1994; Stern, 1990) . The potential for such expansion is considered in depth in other contributions. Here, as a background only to considerations of the prospects for the supply price, we predicate an expansion of gas use in Europe over the 30 years to 2025 as shown irt Table 6 . 4
Overall, this involves a near 100% increase irt gas use irt Western Europe and a two-and-ahalf times irtcrease irt its use irt Eastern Europe from estimated 1995 levels. These increases imply a cumulative use of gas over the 30 year period of more than 16,000 BCM, compared with the cumulated use of under a third of this amount over the 40 year period from 1956-95. Meeting this potential demand clearly irtvolves not only the discovery or addition of large additional reserves within Europe, but also access to increasing volumes of imported gas. Thus, for the first time in the history of the European gas industry, demand irtcreases will 4/ This is derived from research by the author for his contribution to Prognos, 1994 . It is compatible with other recent forecasts of European gas demand (as. for example, by Williams, 1993; Pauwels. 1994) .
and as reported in Prior, 1994, though note that these studies were generally confined to the period to 2010. For consideration of the long-run supply price issues this is, from a 1995 base, too short a period. Hence the need in this paper to extend the period by another 15 years. directly influence upstream activities and, in due course, reduce the contemporary highly favourable gas reserves-to-production ratios to more modest levels.
Under these demand circumstances the cost of longer-run supplies could thus become a critical variable in the further evolution of the irtdustry. We shall argue below, however, that such a development is very unlikely during the time period under consideration in this paper. In order to test this it is necessary to look separately at the irtdigenous supply potential, on the one hand; and, on the other, at the imported gas contribution. Undue dependence on the latter may well be viewed as a serious enough problem to justify demand-side constraints, irrespective of considerations of relative prices (Pauwels, 1994) .
Indigenous Supply Prospects and Prices
This historic importance for Western Europe of Source: see text, footnote 4. its indigenous gas resources is shown in Table  7 . Such indigenous resources have always provided most of the gas used and continue to do so to the extent of almost 70% of the gas supplied. Given the indicated expansion of demand over the next three decades, the role of indigenous production will become even more important to the secure evolution of the market and in helping to maintain a competitive supply situation. This presupposes, of course, that indigenous gas is not only profitable to produce, but also that continued investment in the exploration for, and the exploitation of, additional reserves is economi-cally viable. Given the prolific nature of the occurrence and the potential massive availability of external resources, enhanced gas-an-gas competition could well drive gas prices down so that the economic producibility of the European reserves become an issue of importance and concern. Of the total remaining proven and probable reserves shown in Table 1 , over 60% fall into the proven category; and, by definition (BP, 1995b) , are thus recoverable at present costs, prices and technology. Given the relative maturity of the North Sea oil and gas province within which most of these reserves are located-and within which there exist production and transportation systems which will continue to be usable and/or expanded and extended at modest cost-there is a known availability of at least 5,500 BCM at costs which require no (real) price rises to make the operations profitable. Beyond this, there are the probable reserves (which given their occurrence in a large number of individual fields have an overall high probability of being available) of at least another 3,000 BCM which can also be brought profitably to market within the constraint of present prices. And this already favourable situation for largerscale future production from known reserves is made yet more attractive by the continuing prospect of real-costs' reduction as a result of further progress in exploitation technology (Handley, 1995; Williams, 1992) .
Even more important, as indicated in the footnote to Table I , these reserves estimates relate only to the gas in fields already discovered and declared commercial by 1993, with a modest 5% allowance for reserves' appreciation by the end of 1995. This is a highly conservative view of their ultimate potential given, first, the certainty that, on average, the statistical popu1ation of discovered fields will continue to exhibit the phenomenon of reserves' appreciation. Even the 36 year old Groningen field-for which the estimates of its initially recoverable reserves have been up-graded so many times that they are now declared at twice the level of 1965 when production began-still has some potential for further upward reappraisal (Odell, 1992) . There is a similar prospect for the largest and long-since discovered offshore gas-fields in the southern basin of the North Sea; while, for the to-date little exploited fields of the central basin, the process of effective reserves' evaluation-based, as it must be, on production experience-has barely begun (Kemp, 1994; Stoppart, 1994) .
In the Norwegian sector of the North Sea a recent upward revision of the estimates of reserves (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 1993) has not only greatly enhanced the length of period over which plateau rates of production can be maintained, but has also pushed the country's potential peak production above 100 BCM/year. Except for the Ekofisk and Frigg groups of fields, Norway's gas exploitation history is, indeed, still in its early stages. Given, however, the massive scale of the investment that has already been made in both new production facilities (as, for example, in the Troll fields) and in pipelines to transport the gas to the mainland of Europe (Royal Ministry of Industry and Energy, 1995), coupled with the modest marginal costs which will be incurred in due course in the additional exploitation of the fields, the depletion of whatever volumes of gas are eventually defined as producible is not in doubt at the netback values from today's beach/border prices (see Table 2 ), measured in real terms.
In addition, there is a second major reason for noting the conservatism of current indigenous reserves' data for Europe, namely, the certainty of a continuing process of discovery of new fields in western Europe in the context of high exploration expenditures in both known and prospective gas rich provinces. Outside the North Sea, the mid and north Norwegian and the west of Shetlands basins have already been proved hydrocarbons rich (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 1993; Department of Trade and Industry, 1995) . The former, in particular, has been shown to be gas prone so that proposals for the initial developments of the already discovered fields are already under way. Other areas around the coast of Europe have been demonstrated as having more modest resources, but these could eventually be developable in appropriate locations, relative to emerging gas demand patterns, given the ability of advancing technology to lower field development costs. These, however, will only become 'necessary' to sustain increasing European gas production in the long term.
Meanwhile, on the assumption that indigenous gas will only be able to secure about 60% of future west European gas markets in the face of competition from external suppliers, then the reserves which are known, probable and possible (within the limits set by expected market values expressed in real terms) from the exploitation of existing and planned fields' developments will not only meet the total cumulative requirements to 2025 (some 8,000 BCM), but will also provide at least the minimum carry-over of reserves of about 4,000 BeM for an adequate R/P ratio of 10 to 12 years at that date. This implies additions to reserves over the next 30 years which are equal only to the gross additions to reserves during the last 10 years.
The exploration and exploitation history of Europe's upstream offshore gas industry is still relatively short so that the learning process for effective production continues. Thus, the inevitability of rising costs through the reserves' depletion process seems likely to continue to be offset in whole or in large part by the downward pressures on costs engendered by technological advances (Adelman, 1990 : Handley, 1995 . And as this is starting-in 1995-from a situation in which prices are well above the long-run supply price (so that sizeable rents, taken mainly in the form of taxation and, less so, as super-normal profits, are still being achieved), then, under increasingly competitive conditions, a downward trend in the border /beach price of indigenous gas over the rest of the century towards a lower base level is more likely than not. Note that this development is, indeed, already under way in the UK where current beach prices for gas are only about half those of earlier contracts. On the other hand, expected rising real international oil prices post-2000 (see Table 2 ) will eliminate the validity of that lower gas supply-price as the most appropriate base from which to price European gas. As throughout the past 40 years, the profitability of indigenous gas production seems likely to remain assured by the expected development of the price of intemational oil. On the basis of this range of considerations the potential most likely evolu tion of European gas production is as shown in Table  8 . Growth continues throughout the periodalbeit at a much reduced rate after 2005-to give an overall increase of over 60% over the next three decades.
Europe's Gas Imports
Concern for higher priced gas importssometimes expressed as "the inevitability of higher prices" (Williams, 1993 )-relate in part to exaggerated expectations for the volumes of gas which Europe will have to import. These expectations emerge from the forecasts of much more limited prospects for indigenous production than those indicated above (Pauwels, 1994; Prior, 1994) . Conventional wisdom has long been pessimistic in this respect. For example, views presented through to the late-1980s indicated that the level of indigenous production would have passed its peak by 1990 (International Energy Agency, 1986) so that after only another decade, even within the context of a slow growth in gas use, Western Europe would depend principally on gas imports. Most forecasts on indigenous gas prospects remain relatively pessimistic; differing only in their views on the rate of decline in production from the late 1990s (Prior, 1994) . As shown above, we do not share this viewindeed, have never shared the view-because of the existence of the very' extensive potentially petroliferous areas and of the ready availability in Europe of financial and technological resources whereby long continuing exploration efforts can be sustained (Odell, 1969 and . The success of those efforts in finding and adding to reserves thus enables output to keep moving ahead. Table 7 above shows that this view has to date been fully justified-in spite of deliberately constrained production policies from time to time by the main producing countries. The process will, as argued above, continue and, as shown in Table 9 , severely restrain the rate of increase in import needs. Thus, from an estimated 131 BCM of imports in 1995 (almost three quarters from Russia and most of the rest from Algeria), there will be a modest increase to 170 BCM in 2005, 232 BCM by 2015, and 318 BCM by 2025. The 30 year cumulative volume of gas involved will be no more than 6,500 BCM. Assuming the continuation of Russia and Algeria as the only suppliers and of the present 75:25 split between them, then the call on the former's currently proven reserves of 48,000 BCM would be under 10%, but would be 45% of the 3,600 BCM of Algeria's presently declared reserves. The latter will have to be expanded if Algeria is to maintain its present contribution to Europe's imports.
The Supply and Price of European Imports until 2004
To date, both Russia's and Algeria's access to European markets has been made easy, partly by the political constraints on production in Europe and partly because Germany and Italy, respectively, have, in return for gas imports, achieved important economic advantages in respect of the markets they have secured for goods and services required by the gas industries of the two countries (Estrada, 1988) . Germany and Italy, in turn, ensured success in the construction of the capital intensive transportation infrastructures required to get Russian and Algerian gas to Europe. For the two gas supplying countries there were equally important gains. Its export contracts with European customers enabled Algeria to produce gas with significant economies of scale and thus to secure low-cost gas for use in its own economy. For the former Soviet Union-and, more recently, Russia-the role of gas exports in sustaining the country's hardpressed economy has been crucial (Dienes, Dobozi and Radetzki, 1994) . Sources: See Tables 6 and 8 for gas use and gas production by country, respectively. Forecasts of intra-European trade and gas imports to Europe are derived as indicated in footnote no 4.
These considerations-for both Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and for Algeria and Russia, on the other-continue to apply: though now, of course, in the context of enhanced political problems (Estrada, 1995) . Ignoring the latter, the call on the resources of the two exporters-in terms not only of their gas reserves, but also of their resources of management and finance whereby they can achieve the potential for this higher level of exports to Europe as specified above-remains modest compared with the benefits which the exports will generate.
The two countries will thus be highly motivated to secure the largest share possible of the European gas markets open to imports. As shown above, at least through the two decades to 2015, the markets for imports will remain quantitatively restricted from a combination of quite modest increases in demand and by the expansion of Europe's own output; most notably from the North Sea and adjacent areas, but not excluding proportionately larger, though volumetrically limited increases in gas production in a range of both west and east European countries. This is consequent upon the enhanced exploration and development efforts which will occur, especially in Eastern Europe where opening the upstream gas industry to international expertise, management and investment will, first, stop and, then, reverse the decline in output which has been under way since 1988.
The outlook for prospective exports of gas to Europe will be particularly restricted for the first decade-with, as shown in Table 9 , a forecast requirement for only an additional 39 BCM in 2005 compared with 1995. Contracts are already in place sufficient to meet most of this modestly increased requirement for imports-mainly on the basis of the oil-related prices as used in the existing system. In the current situation of energy over-supply it seems unlikely that the external suppliers will be able to improve on this method of pricing. Indeed, excess supply relative to demand, coupled with the sellers' strong motivation to try to sell more gas, seems more likely to lead to gas prices which move independently of oil on the down-side, though still restricted on the up-side to oil equivalents (see Table 2 ) in the event of the market unexpectedly strengthening over the coming decade. Given their already existing gas production and transport infrastructure, either in place or under construction' whereby most of the expected 2005 level of exports can be handled, neither Algeria nor Russia seem likely to face any problems of economic Viability in fulfilling their obligations and opportunities to supply 104 gas at prices which are no higher, in real terms, than those of today.
For Russia, in particular, the continuing national decline in gas use will free up both the gas itself and the infrastructure capacity required to make it available for export (Stern, 1995) . Thus, the profitable export of all the Russian gas for which markets are likely to be found in Europe by 2005 is hardly in doubt: except, of course, in the context of internal political problems which would disrupt the supply/transportation system and significantly increase costs.
For Algeria, neither the economics of, nor the capacity for, enhanced exports up to the contracted level for 2000 of 60 BCM/year, compared with the approximately 30 BCM which is being exported to Europe in 1995, appear to pose any problems (Estrada, 1995) . It is once again only political problems leading to the partial break-down of the country's gas production and transmission systems, which could pose a physical restraint on gas availabilities and/or the imposition of higher costs. Imports, 2005 Imports, -2014 For this second future decade uncertainty over Europe's gas imports incre,ases: in a pe{iod, moreover, when, as can be calculated from the data in Table 8 , the rate of increase in indigenous production falls to about 1.2%, well below the rapid rate of expansion (of 2.8% / annum) foreseen until 2005. Though all but one of Algeria's contracts extend beyond 2005, this is not the case with Russia's contracts, most of which are valid only until the early years of the 21st century. Of the indicated demand for imports of about 200 BCM by the middle of this period (extrapolated from Table  9 ), less than one half is already contracted under contemporary supply and pricing criteria.
The Supply and Price of
Algeria, we have suggested above, may have been able to increase its'approximate present 25% share of Europe's total imports to as much as 35% by 2005, but its ability to maintain its enhanced position thereafter depends on the necessary expansion of its proven reserves base and on the level of costs at which larger volumes of gas can be exploited and moved to markets via new or expanded pipelines to southern Europe. However, within the context of an oil price rising from today's levels (in real terms) through to $19.60/bbl by 2015 (see Table 2 ) there will be scope for real increases in the delivered gas price up to a maximum of approximately $3.35/mmBTU. Such a price would provide a powerful economic motivation for further investment in Algerian gas exploration, production and transportation and thus provide for the expansion of supplies to Europe to the ±90 BCM which Algeria might wish to try to secure in competition with supplies from Russia (Pauwels, 1994) . However, alternative North African supplies-which, in part, could make use of the same trans-Mediterranean transmission lines-eould also offer a significant potentia addition to the flow of gas to southern Europe by that time. Libyan and Western Desert Egyptian gas provide these possible competing alternatives. This gas lacks effective alternative external markets so that there will be no competing demands for it and thus no upward pricing pressures on the supplies. Russia, however, seems likely to aim to provide up to two-thirds of external gas supplies to Europe in the 2005-14 period as a result of both economic considerations and from the viewpoint of the policy interests of supplier and customers. In the context of the plenitude of Russia's gas reserves, the basic technical competence and the organisational strength of its gas industry (measured by Russian standards) and the interest of international oil and gas companies in the exploitation of Russia's gas resources, it is impossible to forecast just how development will proceed and what specific projects will be completed so as to deliver gas to Europe in the decade beginning in 2005 (Stern, 1995) . There are a number of gas resource development opportunities which could be exploited to provide more than sufficient gas to meet the prospective European demand for Russian gas (rising from about 120 BCM in 2005 to at least 145 BCM in 2014). It does, however, seem more likely than not that the continuity of the rehabilitation process in respect of both the pre-existing production and transmission systems will continue to be central to the profitable export of additional gas to Europe after 2005. This will be in the likely context of an internal demand for gas which even then remains below historically higher levels (as a result of the achievement of a pricemotivated increased efficiency in use by that time) and of a renewed pipeline system in which transportation losses will have been much reduced from today's high levels by the application of western technology, so offering greater throughput capacity (Dienes, Dobozi and Radetzki, 1994; Pauwels, 1994; Stern, 1995) .
Such gas will be low cost relative to the border price (of up to $3.35/mmBTU) which the European gas market will bear in the context of the slowly rising international oil price after 2005. The availability of enough Russian gas sufficient to equilibrate the European market through such relatively low-cost supplies, seems highly probable early in the decade when about 120 BCM a year will be required. Beyond 2005, however, it is conceivable that initial developments in major new gas regions-notably Yamal and the Barents Seawill be poised to make a contribution to Russian gas supplies. Even if these new supplies have a price of more than $3/rnrnBTU and may thus initially have to be "eased" into the market on the basis of a degree of crosssubsidisation from the profits on the use of "rehabilitated" gas, then this still could be in Russia's interests so as to be ready for the time later in the decade when economies of scale in the new areas and through the new lines will become effective enough to sustain the profitable exploitation of the new gas in its own right.
North Africa plus Russia will thus be able, politics permitting, profitably to supply Europe's import requirements through the decade from 2005 to 2014 at border prices which reflect internationally traded oil equivalent values. Over the decade, as shown in Table 2 , these seem likely to rise from $2.85 to about $3.45/rnrnBlli. This oil equivalent value does, of course, only set the upper limit to gas prices imported into Europe, so that gas markets will be able to expand in competition with oil and coal. Under competitive gas market conditions, as seems not unlikely given the plethora of potential supplies, gas prices could well, however, fall below this upside restraint. How far below depends on the degree of competition which emerges between the main external players, namely, Algeria and Russia (both, by that time, with a possible range of individual supplying companies), and between these external suppliers and the competing indigenous producers. The poten tial battles for mar ket shares could, of course, produce very different contributions to supplies from those shown in Tables 8 and 9 . Central Asian gas suppliers, namely, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, would also like and, indeed, expeet to be addi tional competitors for a share of European gas markets in the 2005-2014 period. Given, however, both the geo-politics and the economics of Central Asian to Europe transmission lines, investments in this gas for European markets, even at the oil equivalent prices indicated above, seem likely to be marginally viable at best. Even with the utilisation of best international gas industry practices, the most modern technologies, the required political will and only modest claims for transit fees from Turkey and other intervening countries, getting a gas production and transportation sys tem in place and working effectively so to enable Central Asian gas to be economically deliverable to Europe so early in the 21st century currently seems unlikely; except in the event of a cooperative arrangement whereby Russia transits the gas to the border with Europe. This would be a lowercost option, but it implies Russian control over, and hence limitations on, the deliveries of Central Asian gas in a situation in which Russia would see the gas as competing for its own export opportunities.
The Supply and Price, 2015-2024
In speculating on the third future decade, uncertainties multiply, but so do the number of possibilities for serving the then still growing Euro-gas market. Accessible resources by 2015 will have multiplied as a result of continuing exploration and development investment in the meantime in response to market chal-106 lenges. Cumulative use in the decade will most likely exceed 6,600 BCM, of which less than 60% are likely to come from indigenous resources, leaving almost 2,700 BCM to be provided by imports; rising from some 230 BCM in 2015 to about 320 BCM by the last years of the decade.
Such a larger market will clearly have space for Libyan and Egyptian, as well as Algerian, gas from North Africa. The main expansion of Russian supplies from 2015 will have to be derived from the then recently developed resources of the Yamal Peninsula, the Barents Sea and other regions of the country, depending on where Russian and foreign companies decide to make their investments over the next twenty years. Furthermore, the initial development of gas in Turkmenistan and K"lzahkstan for export to European markets will at last be stimulated by the much larger-scale market opportunities and thus be able to secure significant economies of scale in the operations. And, finally, even some lowcost Middle East gas-from Iran and Qatar particularly-eould well have been developed for export by pipeline to Europe. Thus, Europe's expanding gas markets will become served by a much expanded-and lengthened-transport network implying, of course, higher average transmission costs compared with the earlier decades, albeit in the context of low-cost gas at the well-head, compared with the likely supply costs of indigenous gas by that time.
The ability of such longer-distance gas to profitably enter the European market will be related, in part, to its low supply price at the production locations and, in part, to the higher real prices at which international oil will then be traded-as a consequence of tighter supply / demand relationships emerging in the international oil market by that time from the high and still growing demand for oil products in South Asia, the western" Pacific Rim and other parts of what is now the developing world. Over the 10 year period from 2015, we forecast the oil price to rise from $19.60 to $25. 65/bbl (in 1995$) . In this oil price context the competitive entry price for gas at the borders of Europe will increase from $3.25 to $4.75/mmBTU (also in 1995$).
Though the increase in the size of the Eurogas market for imports will have become considerabeby this third decade in the future, the volume of gas involved will remain, nevertheless, relatively modest in relation to the volume and diversity of gas reserves' developments which will be stimulated by the opportunities offered by European outlets. Thus, investments in the meantime by national and international interests in many regions capable of supplying Europe after 2015, in the context of an anticipated higher price for gas as a result of oil market developments, could lead to a situation in which too much infrastructure capacity is created and thus to a potential over-supply of gas. The continuation in such circumstances of a squeeze on prices arising from gas-on-gas competition would, of course, lead to an average border price for the 230 to 320 BCM of gas required per annum, which is below the oil equivalent prices indicated above.
Large though an import of up to 320 BCM of natural gas to Europe may seem compared with the present situation (of only 130 BCM), it is worth noting that in energy terms the volume of imported gas demanded pales into relative insignificance in the perspective of Europe's relatively recent history as an energy importer. Over 20 years ago-in 1973-Europe imported well over 800 million tons of oil, the energy equivalent of almost three times that which will be provided by 320 BCM of natural gas imports some 30 years hence.
Conclusions
The issues and arguments which underpin the thrust of the paper can be summarised as follows:
• the assumption of a growth market for gas in Europe predicated on the basis of a fundamental shift in the perception of gas availabilities and on gas' role in the energy market; and the argument that this shift will undermine the structure of the industry as it has evolved to date, whereby both supply and demand have been curtailed by monopoly and monopsony to levels below those which would have developed in a competitive market;
• the argument that Europe itself is gas-rich beyond present general perceptions and that the economics of developing indigenous supply over the next 30 years to a level 60% higher than in 1995 are soundly based;
• the view that oil-equivalent prices will continue to set the upper limit to well-head/ beach/border prices for gas and that this expectation creates the prospects for an "easy" gas supply situation throughout the 30 year period under review;
• the claim that Europe is favoured by the existence of a set of external gas-rich regions with a total potential for supplying gas well beyond the highest possible market prospect, and that it is Europe, rather than any other market or markets, which provides the best opportunities for those suppliers to achieve returns from the exploitation of their gas;
• the argument that in the context of a highly competitive supply side prospect, actual well-head/beach/border prices for gas in Europe will normally be under the upper limit set by oil-price equivalence; • the idea that, in this situation, the supply price for gas may not be the main pricing prob lem facing European gas users. It is the non-competitive structure and behaviour of gas sellers which have kept prices high and restricted market growth. The competitive gas supply development predicated in this paper will need to be matched by a degree of market Iiberalisation whereby the 'fat' created by the protected sellers' behaviour is eliminated.
